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Abstract
We report the results of an experiment designed to study the determinants of asset price move-
ment and consumption smoothing behavior across asset markets populated with varying proportion
of traders with and without having induced motive to smooth consumption. Although the asset is
over-priced compared to the risk-neutral fundamental value in all sessions, the extent of over-pricing
and magnitude of price movement is significantly higher when traders with no induced motive to
trade are present. We also find that the price of the asset co-moves with the dividend state, with
price predictability being higher in the presence of traders with induced motive to smooth con-
sumption. Participants motivated to minimize consumption fluctuations are able to do so with the
inclination being more for those having lower initial endowment. With fixed prices, traders are able
to smooth consumption not only over periods but also over the dividend states.
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1 Introduction
Asset markets are an integral part of modern economies. The reason for engaging in trade might differ
across individual investors. Some of them might exchange assets in the pursuit of pure capital gains:
buying at low prices and selling at higher prices. Others might use asset markets to generate a smooth
stream of intertemporal consumption that would help cushion income fluctuations over time. That is,
they buy assets when income is high and sell them to generate cash when income is low.
The idea that people dislike having fluctuations in their consumption when experiencing short run
income fluctuations features prominently in the Permanent Income Hypothesis (Friedman (1957)). In
the presence of short run income fluctuations, people would want to smooth their consumption across
periods by consuming only a fraction of their current income and allocating their remaining income
on precautionary activities. Figure 1 shows the quarterly percentage change in consumption and
disposable income since 19981. The variability in the disposable income series is generally greater
than that in consumption.
Figure 1: Real quarterly growth in consumption and disposable income.
1Source: Based on data from Quarterly National Accounts, National Statistics (Series ABJR, HAYO and NRJR);
also available at http://pearsonblog.campaignserver.co.uk/?tag=consumption-smoothing
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There are many ways in which people do precautionary activities. They may, for example, place
their remaining income on saving and deposit. Alternatively, they may also invest their remaining
income in security market and utilize the security returns to boost their consumption when experi-
encing a negative income shock. This paper focuses on the role of stock trading as a consumption
smoothing instrument. Specifically, we are interested in answering the following set of questions. First,
do asset prices deviate from the intrinsic value of the underlying asset? If so, would the deviation be
the same across markets populated with varying proportion of agents with differing trading motives,
where some of them primarily want to smooth consumption and others want to engage in speculation?
Second, would consumption smoothing ability of agents with the induced motive to smooth consump-
tion be affected by the composition of agents with differing trading motives in the market? Third, to
the extent that the aggregate output is predictable, do asset prices have a predictable component as
well? Fourth, is it possible to link the extent of price predictability to the number of agents in the
marketplace who are primarily trading to offset the income fluctuations over time?
In order to answer the above questions, we design an experimental asset market that is close
to the setting under consumption-based general-equilibrium asset-pricing approach (Stiglitz (1970),
Lucas (1978), Breeden (1979)). Knowing the answers to these questions would provide insights into
which naturally occurring markets are more prone to mispricing and might provide rationale for what
contributes to price predictability.
We consider an environment with an indefinite horizon economy with a single perishable con-
sumption good and a long-lived asset. While laboratory markets are much simpler in structure than
actual asset markets in the field and thus studying them may not address some of the questions that
are important to applied researchers, they provide an invaluable controlled setting where certain hy-
potheses can be empirically tested and confounding factors can be isolated. The endowments, income
processes, as well as dividends paid by the asset are perfectly observed in the experiments. Deviations
in prices due to variation in the underlying dividend process can be computed with precision and we
can compare this measure across different markets. The uncertainty with regards to the dividend paid
by the asset or the price of the asset can be introduced into and removed from an environment in
which other factors are held constant.
There is a vast experimental literature on asset pricing that has significantly enhanced our un-
derstanding of price formation in markets. Early studies, including Plott et al. (1982), Forsythe et al.
(1982), Friedman et al. (1984) motivated agents to trade by providing heterogeneous dividend values.
They found that market prices effectively aggregate private information about dividends and tended
to converge toward rational expectations values. Smith et al. (1988) introduced a particular class
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of asset market that tends to generate price bubbles2. Researchers had shown that the phenomenon
of asset price bubble is robust to a variety of changes in the market structure (see, e.g., King et al.
(1993), Van Boening et al. (1993), Porter and Smith (1995), Caginalp et al. (1998), Lei et al. (2001),
Dufwenberg et al. (2005), Haruvy and Noussair (2006), Haruvy et al. (2007), Hussam et al. (2008),
Kirchler et al. (2012))3. In all of these studies, a market was created for a dividend-paying asset with a
lifetime of a finite number of periods, and the asset structure was common knowledge. The volume of
trade was substantial and a sustained duration of prices that greatly exceeded the fundamental value
before finally crashing to prices close to fundamental values near to the end of the experiment was the
typical empirical pattern observed. Another strand of literature studies the static capital asset pricing
model in the laboratory with only asset-derived income and no labor/endowment income (Bossaerts
and Plott (2002), Asparouhova et al. (2003), Bossaerts et al. (2007)).
In our experiments, several participants are motivated to engage in trade in order to offset income
fluctuations they face over time. Thus, the primary reason for exchange for these participants in our
setting is to mainly perform consumption smoothing, a feature which is absent in the experimental
asset pricing literature, except two recent papers, Asparouhova et al. (2016) and Crockett and Duffy
(2015). Both of these studies consider multiple period and indefinite horizon setting to study dynamic
asset pricing and consumption smoothing in the laboratory. Asparouhova et al. (2016) induced
preference for consumption smoothing by paying only for the last period, forfeiting payments in all
periods that end not being terminal. This perishable feature of payments (cash) at the end of the
interim periods is meant to capture the notion that the remaining cash not used as medium of exchange
must be spent solely on consumption in that period. Perishable consumption good is an important
feature of the consumption-based general-equilibrium dynamic asset-pricing framework. In contrast,
to create an induced motive for consumption smoothing, Crockett and Duffy (2015) imposed a schedule
of final payments to participants that is non-linear in period earnings.
To keep the analysis and experimental design simple, traders are told about the exogenous un-
certainty with regards to the dividend process and they must learn to take into consideration the
endogenous uncertainty, i.e., the price process. Also, from the outset, agents know the income shock
that they will receive in each period. We further simplify the setting by having only one security
market open in any session that traders could exchange their assets. Cash plays a dual role within
a period: as medium of exchange and as consumption good. While cash is perishable at the end of
an interim period, the assets are long-lived and are the only intertemporal store of value. Similar
2A bubble is typically defined as “trade in high volumes at prices that are considerably at variance from intrinsic
values”. This definition is given by King et al. (1993).
3For a review of the literature, see Sunder (1995) or Duxbury (1995) as well as chapters 29 and 30 in Plott and Smith
(2008).
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to Asparouhova et al. (2016), we pay participants only for the cash in the last period to mimic the
perishability of cash. Motivation for trade is provided to certain participants by making their income
process variable over time. Other traders are insulated from income shocks by having their endowment
of income constant in each period. However, unlike Asparouhova et al. (2016) and Crockett and Duffy
(2015), we depart from the focus on testing the predictions of Lucas (1978) model. Instead, we study
treatments by varying the proportion of traders having constant income endowment in each period
vis-a´-vis those having endowed income fluctuations.
We present several results. First, we find that the asset is overpriced compared to the risk-neutral
fundamental value in all our sessions. In the presence of traders who do not experience any endowed
income fluctuation over time, the extent of overpricing is higher and the variability of prices is larger.
This is in comparison to markets where all agents have induced motive to smooth consumption in
order to offset income fluctuations. Second, traders experiencing endowed income fluctuations were
naturally aware of the need to smooth their income across periods through trading. We observe
consumption smoothing behavior for these type of agents. Those traders having a constant stream
of income do not show signs of such behavior. A certain subset of traders who do not experience
any income variability over time are able to exploit the predictability of prices by buying low and
selling high where the change in state primarily propels the variation in prices. In sessions where we
fix the price and let agents buy/sell to the experimenter instead of engaging in an asset market, we
find that individuals show preference for consumption smoothing not only over time but also across
dividend states. Third, prices co-move with the underlying dividend state of the asset. We find strong
evidence that prices have a significant predictable component in all our treatments. Close to 50% of
the variation in prices can be explained by changes in the dividend state in the presence of agents for
whom the primary motivation to trade is to smooth consumption.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related background
research and discusses questions that we ask in our study. In section 3, we describe the design and
procedures of the experiment, and in section 4 we present the data. Section 5 summarizes our findings.
2 Background
The experiment is designed specifically to answer four research questions related to price dynamics,
price predictability and consumption smoothing behavior in asset markets. Asparouhova et al. (2016)
and Crockett and Duffy (2015) have already provided us with the framework to induce consump-
tion smoothing conduct in the laboratory. Both document considerable support for the predictions
emerging out of the consumption-based general-equilibrium models of dynamic asset pricing. Specif-
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ically, Asparouhova et al. (2016) test the predictions of the Lucas intertemporal asset pricing model
(Lucas(1978)) and find features in the data that are consistent with the most important predictions.
Agents trade assets to smooth consumption and insure against risk, and there exists an equity pre-
mium that is counter-cyclical. They also report that prices are excessively volatile4. As opposed to
the model, which predicts that changes in the dividend state should explain 100% of price changes,
they find the corresponding value to be merely 18%. In markets with a single security which pays
a constant dividend each period, Crockett and Duffy (2015) find support for the claim that the fre-
quency, magnitude, and duration of asset price bubbles can be reduced by the presence of an incentive
to intertemporally smooth consumption in an otherwise identical economy.
Markets outside the laboratory are likely to be populated with individuals where some of them
trade in the pursuit of capital gains while others use the asset market primarily to offset income
fluctuations that they experience over time. With the hope of mimicking such an environment, we
create treatments where we systematically vary the number of traders who face intertemporal income
variability and hence have induced motive to trade in order to smooth consumption. The first research
question asks whether the dynamics of asset prices, including the magnitude of price changes as well
as the determinants of this variation, differ as we vary the number. We also investigate whether prices
deviate from intrinsic values. Specifically, our first research questions is,
Research Question 1: Do differences in the price dynamics across markets depend on the
proportion of agents having an induced motive to offset the income fluctuations by trading assets?
The setting used in our study enables us to investigate the predictability of asset prices. The
sufficient amount of control in our experiments allows us to contribute to the debate on whether
market efficiency and price predictability can co-exist in asset markets. The original accounts of the
Efficient Market Hypothesis stated that prices must not be predictable (Samuelson (1973), Malkiel
(1999)); investors would trade to exploit the predictability and in the process eliminate it. Using
historical data from the field, several studies have documented that prices have a significant predictable
component (Campbell and Shiller (1988), Fama and French (1988), Lo and MacKinlay (1988), Bernard
and Thomas (1989), Fama (1990)).
The phenomenon of price predictability has been explained primarily in terms of cognitive biases
in investor decision making (De Bondt and Thaler (1985), Daniel et al. (1998), De Long et al.
(1990)). Another potential explanation for predictability is that the correct general equilibrium model
of asset returns is consistent with the variation of returns over time. Extending the Lucas (1978)
framework, Balvers et al. (1990) and Cecchetti et al. (1990) build models that demonstrate that
4The term excessive volatility is used to denote the fact that a large fraction of price movements is unrelated to the
changes in the underlying dividend state (LeRoy and Porter (1981), Shiller (1981)).
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predictability is not inconsistent with the concept of efficient markets. They argue that the interplay
between consumption smoothing and risk correction can generate mean-reverting behavior of stock
returns. In order to maximize expected utility, investors attempt to smooth consumption by adjusting
their required rate of return for financial assets. The main message from these intertemporal models
based on consumption smoothing is that stock returns can be predicted to the extent that there is
predictability in the endowment process. Because we can perfectly control and observe the endowment
process in laboratory markets, we can compute measures of predictability with greater precision. More
importantly, we can compare this measure across markets differing in the proportion of investors whose
primary aim is to smooth consumption. This constitutes our next research query.
Research Question 2: Are prices predictable, in the sense that changes in the dividend state
explain the variation in prices? Is price predictability higher in markets where traders participate in
asset trading primarily to smooth consumption?
The next question that we are interested in is concerned with the behavior of traders in markets
where agents with and without the intertemporal income fluctuations are present. We expect that
traders who face income variability would attempt to smooth their consumption stream by taking part
in trading activity via the asset market. Lower trading volume is expected out of agents who have
constant income flow throughout and these traders are more likely to engage in speculative trades than
the ones having income fluctuations. Also, if prices are predictable, it is possible that certain traders
are able to make use of this predictability for their own benefit. We seek to identify the characteristics
of these traders too as part of the third research question.
Research Question 3: In markets where different types of traders co-exist, do we see a clear
difference in behavior of agents with endowed income fluctuations who would have induced motive for
consumption smoothing and agents without endowed income fluctuations who would not have induced
motive for consumption smoothing? Are there traders who are able to exploit the feature of price
predictability in markets for their own benefit?
There are several sources of uncertainty in our setup. A laboratory investigation allows us to
create treatments designed specifically to test the implication of a particular uncertainty in question
on the relevant variables of interest. Our last research question is aimed at understanding the effect
of eliminating asset price uncertainty by fixing the price at which an individual can buy/sell to the
experimenter. Thus, there is no asset market in the strict sense; participants only engage in exchange
of securities at fixed prices with the experimenter who acts as an intermediary. The setting collapses
to that of individual-choice and presents subjects with the simplest of environments. The economy is
still indefinite-horizon and cash remains perishable at the end of a period to provide sufficient incentive
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for agents to smooth consumption.
Research Question 4: Does a simpler environment, where asset price uncertainty is absent,
results in a different strategy being used by agents with respect to their consumption smoothing behav-
ior?
3 Experimental Design
3.1 General Structure
The data for this study were gathered from 15 experimental sessions conducted at the Nanyang
Technological University (NTU), Singapore. There were 16 participants in all sessions but one where
we had only 14 participants. Thus, in total we had 238 participants. They were recruited from
the population of undergraduate students at NTU from various majors ranging from Social Sciences,
Business and Economics, Humanities, Engineering, and Sciences. No subject participated in more
than one session of this experiment. The sessions lasted approximately two hours and participants
earned on average S$24.20 in addition to a show-up fee of S$25.
We implemented an indefinite horizon economy with a single perishable consumption good in
each period. The standard procedure (Camerer and Weigelt (1996)) was used to induce discounting
in the laboratory. We randomly determined whether a period was terminal. This ending procedure
induced discounting with a discount factor equal to the probability of continuation. Assuming that
subjects are expected utility maximizers with time-separable preferences, a stochastic ending time is
(theoretically) equivalent to discounting over an infinite time horizon. At the end of each period, a
six-sided die was rolled in public view of all participants. If the die roll was 6, we terminated the
economy; otherwise, we continued to the next period. Thus, we had an indefinite horizon economy
with a constant termination probability of 1/6 per period.
In the experiment, the consumption good was represented by cash which was “made” perishable in
each period. That is, at the end of every non-terminal period, any remaining cash holdings disappeared.
Only cash held at the end of the randomly determined terminal period was credited to participants’
final payout accounts (and hence “consumed”). Thus, we did not literally have consumption every
period; participants in our experiments faced the same optimization problem as if they actually had
to consume every period.
We also implemented the following termination protocol introduced in Asparouhova et al. (2016).
It was announced that the experimental session would last until a pre-specified time and there would
5Payoffs, inclusive of the show-up fee, ranged from S$2 to S$70.80 with a standard deviation of S$11.64.
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be as many replications of the economy as could be fit within the time limit. If a replication ended
at least ten minutes before the announced ending time of the session, a new replication would begin;
otherwise, the experimental session would end. If a replication was still running ten minutes prior
to the indicated ending time of the session, we announced before market opened for trading that the
current period would be either the last one (if the die turned up 6) or the next-to-last one (if the die
turned up 1-5). This termination rule ensured that the laboratory economy was stationary6.
Each period, an asset market was opened where agents could buy and sell securities. The asset
was long-lived and carried forward to the next period if the current period was non-terminal. In the
event that the current period turned out to be terminal, all securities expired worthless. Participants
in our experiment belonged to one of the four types of traders as mentioned in Table 1. The table
summarizes the types of traders, traders’ per period exogenous income, and traders’ initial endowment
of assets at the beginning of a replication.
Agent type Per period exogenous income ($) Initial assets (units)
I $0 in odd periods and $15 in even periods 20
II $15 in odd periods and $0 in even periods 5
III $7.5 in odd and even periods 20
IV $7.5 in odd and even periods 5
Table 1: Types of Traders, per period exogenous income, and initial assets
Thus, the characteristic of a trader differed across two dimensions. The first dimension is whether
she started out with a relatively larger endowment of assets (asset-rich) or smaller endowment (asset-
poor). Types I and III were asset-rich while types II and IV were asset-poor. The second dimension
was the nature of the income shock received in each period. Type-I and Type-II traders received
income every alternate period. On the other hand, the other two types did not have any income
fluctuations across periods. Participants only knew their own endowment of assets and the process of
income shocks; they were not informed about others’ characteristics.
We varied the number of the different types of traders in each session7. Summary information
about each session is given in Table 2. For each session, indexed by identification number in the first
column, the table indicates the experimental treatments we implemented in the second column and
the number of replications in each session in the third column, along with the number of periods in
the fourth column. It also lists the number of different types of traders per session in the fifth column.
The parameters of the experiment, that include, the initial endowment of assets, the income shock in
each period, the number of different types of traders per session, etc, were chosen to ensure that the
6For a detailed discussion on the termination protocol, see Asparouhova et al. (2016). They showed that the
termination rule produces pricing as if the economy were to continue forever.
7We elaborate on this issue later (Subsection 3.3) when we discuss the various treatments we implemented.
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aggregate amount of initial cash endowment given by the prevailing patterns of the income shocks8
and the total number of assets in the economy remained constant across periods and sessions9.
Table 2: Summary data, all experimental sessions.
Session Treatment Number of
replications
Number of periods (To-
tal within session, min-
imum across replica-
tions, maximum)
Subject count by
type of trader
(type I, type II,
type III, type IV)
1 Baseline (BL) 3 (22,2,12) (8,8,0,0)
2 Baseline (BL) 3 (17,1,13) (8,8,0,0)
3 Baseline (BL) 3 (17,1,9) (8,8,0,0)
4 Constant Income (CI) 6 (20,1,7) (0,0,8,8)
5 Constant Income (CI) 2 (19,7,12) (0,0,8,8)
6 Constant Income (CI) 1 (16,16,16) (0,0,8,8)
7 Mixed Market (MM) 3 (23,3,11) (4,4,4,4)
8 Mixed Market (MM) 1 (10,10,10) (4,3,3,4)
9 Mixed Market (MM) 4 (18,1,13) (4,4,4,4)
10 Constant Dividend (CD) 4 (20,3,7) (8,8,0,0)
11 Constant Dividend (CD) 4 (19,3,7) (8,8,0,0)
12 Constant Dividend (CD) 4 (19,2,8) (8,8,0,0)
13 Fixed Price (FP) 5 (20,1,9) (8,8,0,0)
14 Fixed Price (FP) 2 (14,4,10) (8,8,0,0)
15 Fixed Price (FP) 2 (18,2,16) (8,8,0,0)
Total 47 (272,1,16)
All accounting and trading were done in Singapore dollars. The market was computerized10
and we used the continuous double auction trading rules (Smith, 1962) implemented with the z-Tree
computer program (Fischbacher (2007)).
3.2 Timing of the sessions
The sequence of events in sessions was as follows. Upon arrival, subjects were seated at visually
isolated computer workstations. Instructions were read aloud and subjects also received a copy of
the instructions11. Participants familiarized themselves with key aspects of trading in the open-book
double auction mechanism (placing bids and asks, order cancellations, understanding the transaction
determination protocol, etc.) through one mock replication of our economy during the instructional
8The exact amount of cash in the economy in each period consisted of the total initial cash endowments generated by
the prevailing patterns of income shocks in each period plus the cash from dividends obtained from the securities held
in each period. Thus, depending on the realization of the dividend, the exact amount of cash varied across periods.
9Sessions 8 and 13-15 are the only exceptions. This is because we only had 14 traders in session 8. The number of
assets per-trader was also constant in sessions 1-12. The number of assets in the economy (as well as per-trader) was not
constant for sessions 13-15 which constituted a treatment that was fundamentally different from all the other treatments
implemented in sessions 1-12. Please refer to Subsection 3.3 for details.
10Trading took place through anonymous, electronic continuous open book system.
11A sample copy of the instructions is provided in the Appendix.
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phase of the experiment. Activity during the mock replication did not count toward final earnings.
After the instructional phase was completed, the paid phase of the experiment began with the
first replication of the economy. Agents received their initial endowments of the asset and cash. The
market unfolded period by period, with each such period being terminal with 1/6 probability. Every
period, each subject entered with holdings of the asset from a prior period, and received cash, in
the form of income, with the magnitude depending on the prevailing pattern of income shock, and
dividends. A period lasted for three minutes, within which all subjects were free to purchase and sell
units of the asset at any time provided that they do not violate the short-selling (negative holdings)
constraint. In addition, subjects were required to maintain a positive cash balance to make any
purchases. If engaging in a trade would violate either the short sale or cash balance constraint, the
computer program prohibited individuals from doing so12. Termination uncertainty resolved at the
conclusion of each period, after subjects established their assets and cash holdings for that period.
Thus, each period, a subject had to decide how to re-distribute her wealth across cash and assets.
She knew that there was a given chance (1/6) that the replication would end that period, at which
point she would earn the cash she was holding, but the assets she still had in her portfolio became
worthless. With the remaining chance (5/6), the economy moved to a subsequent period, and the
subject forfeited her cash as the latter was perishable and thus could not be carried forward to the
new period. Subjects were allowed to carry the assets over to the next period; this would generate
new cash (in the form of dividends) in the new period.
Within each experimental session, we conducted as many replications as possible within the
time allotted13. Whenever a replication terminated and there was still time left in the session, we
initiated a new replication. Thus, the termination protocol was only applied to at most one of the
replications in a session. If a replication ended naturally (i.e., through the roll of the die) close to the
10-minute mark before the end of a session, we did not start a new replication. We paid for two of the
replications, randomly chosen after the conclusion of the experiment. If a session ended with exactly
two replications, then we paid for both. If a session only had one replication, we paid two times the
earnings from the sole replication.
3.3 Treatments
We implemented five (5) treatments and conducted three (3) sessions for each of them. Table 3
summarizes all five treatments. We refer to sessions 1-3 as the Baseline (BL) treatment. In each
12No borrowing or short sales are standard restrictions in asset market experiments.
13Following completion of the last replication, subjects also participated in the standard risk-elicitation task (Holt and
Laury (2002)).
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session, half of the participants were assigned the role of Type-I trader and the other half were
assigned the role of Type-II trader. Thus, each subject had an induced motive to trade in order to
offset the income fluctuations across periods. A single long-lived asset was available for trading in the
marketplace that paid, in each period, a stochastic dividend of 1 ECU when the state of nature was
good and 0 ECU when the state of nature was bad. The states were equally likely and the dividend
was common for all units and subjects.
Table 3: Summary of treatments.
Treatment Composition
of agent types
Dividend per share
(ECUs)
Asset price
(ECUs)
Baseline I, II 0 or 1 Market
(BL) (equal probability) determined
Constant Income III, IV 0 or 1 Market
(CI) (equal probability) determined
Mixed Market I, II, III, IV 0 or 1 Market
(MM) (equal probability) determined
Constant Dividend I, II 0.5 Market
(CD) determined
Fixed Price I, II 0 or 1 2.5
(FP) (equal probability)
Sessions 4-6 constituted the Constant Income (CI) treatment, and sessions 7-9 constituted the
Mixed Market (MM) treatment. These sessions differed from the BL treatment in the composition
of the traders by type. In sessions 4-6, half of the subjects were assigned the role of Type-III trader
and the other half were assigned the role of Type-IV trader. The MM sessions had four traders of
each type 14. Thus, in the BL sessions, 100% traders had an induced motive to minimize the income
fluctuations due to the alternating income cycle across periods. In contrast, this percentage is only
50% for MM sessions and 0% under CI treatment. A comparison of these three treatments allowed
us to investigate the effect of composition of the asset market in terms of the proportion of traders
with the induced motive to smooth consumption on asset price patterns, determinants of asset price
movements across periods and consumption smoothing behavior.
Constant Dividend (CD) treatment comprised of sessions 10-12. These sessions were similar to
the BL sessions except that the long-lived asset available for trading paid a constant dividend of
0.50 ECU per period instead of a stochastic dividend. Given the fact that the expected dividend
from a unit of the asset is the same in BL and CD sessions, a direct comparison between these two
treatments enabled us to study the effect of dividend uncertainty on the dynamics of asset prices and
14The sole exception was session 8, where we managed to recruit only 14 subjects. There were seven traders having
income fluctuations across periods while seven had constant income each period. So, the proportion of traders in the
market with induced motive to smooth consumption across periods was still 0.5.
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the consumption smoothing behavior.
Sessions 13-15 constituted the Fixed Price (FP) treatment. These sessions were similar to the BL
sessions except that we eliminated the price and liquidity uncertainty of the asset. Participants could
buy or sell the asset to the experimenter at an exogenous fixed market price of 2.5 ECU15. This price
corresponded to the risk-neutral fundamental value of a unit of the asset at any instant. This is because
the asset was long-lived in an infinite horizon economy with a discount factor of 5/6. Thus, if a trader
held a unit of the asset today, it was worth (0.5)(5/6) + (0.5)(5/6)2 + ... = (0.5)(5/6)( 11−5/6) = 2.5 in
terms of expected payoff.
We do, however, note that constant prices are obviously not realistic. Nevertheless, by running
FP treatment, we would be able to eliminate the influence of price uncertainty on trading activities,
and this would allow us to cleanly study whether; (a) subjects show preferences for consumption
smoothing in the simplest trading environment and (b) they engage in consumption smoothing more
vigorously. Thus, this treatment essentially serves as our litmus test to ensure that our subjects
fully grasped the need to smooth consumption when experiencing income shocks. Note that in FP
treatment, the uncertainty with respect to the dividend in each period remained as the asset paid
a stochastic dividend and the uncertainty with respect to the planning horizon arising due to our
indefinite horizon economy was still present as well. We kept these two features of uncertainty intact
to facilitate comparison with our baseline treatment.
To summarize, every replication within a session had the setting of an indefinite horizon economy
with a single perishable consumption good in each period. Thus, there was uncertainty regarding
the planning horizon in all of our treatments. BL, CI, MM and FP sessions were characterized by
dividend uncertainty due to the presence of the risky asset. In contrast, CD sessions had a risk-free
security for trading which paid a constant dividend each period. Uncertainty about future prices was
present in all treatments except FP sessions. Finally, all traders in treatments BL, CD and FP had
income fluctuations across periods, while only half of the participants were provided with an induced
motive to offset the income swings in MM treatment. CI sessions had zero traders with the induced
motive to smooth consumption across periods.
4 Results
In this section, we present the most prominent empirical patterns observed in our experimental data.
While subsection 4.1 compares asset price dynamics across treatments, subsection 4.2 analyzes the
15Provided that they did not violate the short sale or positive cash balance constraints. We also placed restrictions on
the maximum number of assets that one can hold at any instant.
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factors affecting the price swings between trading periods in each treatment. Findings on trading
volume and activity across treatments are documented in subsection 4.3. The final subsection provides
observations with respect to consumption smoothing and trading strategies across different types of
traders.
4.1 Transaction prices across treatments
Figure 2: Time series of transaction prices of the asset by treatment; averages per period for each
session. Solid dots represent the first period of a new replication.
The time series of mean transaction prices by period in each of the BL sessions, as well as in the three
other treatments CI, MM, and CD, are given in Figure 2. The panels in the figure show that prices
are consistently higher than the risk-neutral fundamental value of 2.5 in all treatments. Tables 4 and
5 list the period-average transaction prices across the four treatments. Table 4 provides the period
average prices, their standard deviation, the minimum and the maximum prices, and the number of
observations (periods) for all treatments. From Table 4 we can observe that the mean price, as well as
the standard deviation, are lowest in the sessions where the asset pays a constant dividend. Table 5
gives the period average prices for the initial period, the final half of the periods, and the final period.
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Table 4: Period-average transaction prices across treatments.
Treatment Mean Standard
deviation
Minimum Maximum No. of ob-
servations
BL 5.09 2.18 2.53 10 56
CI 4.31 1.44 1.99 6.65 55
MM 5.44 1.13 3.55 9.43 51
CD 3.91 0.95 2.19 5.34 58
Table 5: Period-average transaction prices across treatments, sub-divided by periods.
Treatment First period Final half Final period τ p-value
BL 5.28 4.74 4.46 -0.07 0.438
CI 3.32 4.33 3.81 0.41 < 0.0001
MM 5.21 5.61 5.30 0.01 0.941
CD 4.06 3.84 3.91 -0.12 0.217
τ from test for monotonic trend.
The numbers confirm the visual impression obtained from Figure 2.
Table 5 provides further insights into the trend of the transaction prices over time in each of
the four treatments. In the sessions where all traders have an induced motive to offset the income
fluctuations across periods (BL and CD sessions), prices decline over time. In the other sessions,
average transaction prices go up over time. The Kendall τ values and the significance levels (p-values)
are reported in the last two columns of Table 5. A positive significant trend is observed for the
CI treatment which suggests that the extent of mispricing grows over time in the environment with
traders who have no induced motive to smooth consumption in order to offset the periodic income
fluctuations. The main conclusion we draw from the data with respect to transaction prices and
mispricing is stated below as Result 1.
Result 1: (i) Transaction prices are higher than the risk-neutral fundamental value in all treat-
ments. (ii) The extent of the mispricing is larger in the presence of traders without induced motive to
smooth consumption.
Thus, consumption smoothing essentially acts as an instrument to dampen the mispricing of the
asset. Table 6 shows the relative deviation of mean prices from the risk-neutral fundamental value for
the first and final periods. It also provides the deviation of median prices from the fundamental value
in each period. Thus, we use the following two per-period measures of mispricing: (Pt−FVt)/FVt and
MedianPt−FVt, where Pt is the mean price in period t, FVt is equal to the risk-neutral fundamental
value of 2.5 and MedianPt is the median price in period t. It also gives the Kendall τ values for
each measure of mispricing along with the p-values from the test for the presence of monotonic trend
for each treatment. The positive values for the per-period measures of mispricing in Table 6 imply
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Table 6: Per-period Mispricing Measures across treatments: first and final periods.
Treatment (Pt − FVt)/FVt MedianPt − FVt
First pd. Final pd. τ p-value First pd. Final pd. τ p-value
Baseline 1.11 0.78 -0.08 0.429 2.78 1.96 -0.08 0.429
Constant Income 0.33 0.52 0.41 < 0.0001 0.85 1.33 0.40 < 0.0001
Mixed Market 1.08 1.12 0.005 0.967 2.76 2.88 -0.002 0.993
Constant Dividend 0.62 0.57 -0.12 0.219 1.57 1.41 -0.12 0.235
τ from test for monotonic trend.
Table 7: OLS regression of per-period mispricing measure on treatment dummies and market risk
aversion.
Explanatory Variables (Pt − FVt)/FVt MedianPt − FVt
“Constant Income” Treatment Dummy 0.339***(0.092) 0.844*** (0.229)
“Mixed Market” Treatment Dummy 0.441*** (0.104) 1.114*** (0.258)
“Constant Dividend” Treatment Dummy 0.030 (0.063) 0.078 (0.157)
Market’s Avg. Risk Aversion -18.96*** (1.827) -47.43*** (4.547)
Market’s Avg. Risk Aversion Squared 1.520*** (0.146) 3.805*** (0.363)
Period 0.023* (0.012) 0.061** (0.030)
Constant 59.31*** (5.698) 148.3*** (14.19)
Number of Observations 220 220
R2 0.428 0.437
*significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%
overpricing of the asset compared to the constant risk-neutral fundamental value. The magnitude of
overpricing increases significantly in the absence of traders with induced motive to trade in order to
smooth consumption.
Table 7 provides results from the OLS regression of the per-period measures of mispricing on
treatment dummies and market average risk aversion. The baseline category is the BL treatment.
The coefficients on CI and MM dummies are significant and positive while the coefficient on CD
dummy is insignificant. Both the BL and CD treatments are populated with traders all of whom have
income fluctuations across periods. There is no significant difference in the extent of mispricing across
these two treatments. Thus, after controlling for the risk aversion level in the market, the extent of
mispricing is significantly higher for CI and MM sessions where Type-III and Type-IV traders are
present.
4.2 Determinants of price movement between periods and price predictability
The next result compares the magnitude of price movement between periods across our treatments.
Result 2: The magnitude of price change between periods is greater in the presence of traders
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Table 8: OLS regression of change in period-average transaction price. Standard errors are in paren-
theses.
Explanatory Variables Pooled Baseline Constant
Income
Mixed Mar-
ket
Constant
Dividend
Change in State
Dummy#
0.689***
(0.067)
0.784***
(0.142)
0.605***
(0.135)
0.724***
(0.084)
“Constant Income”
Treatment Dummy
0.191*
(0.105)
“Mixed Market”
Treatment Dummy
0.226**
(0.103)
“Constant Dividend”
Treatment Dummy
0.089
(0.089)
Lagged Excess Demand 0.006***
(0.002)
0.002
(0.004)
0.010***
(0.003)
0.015***
(0.004)
-0.002
(0.002)
Period -0.004
(0.012)
-0.007
(0.027)
0.002
(0.023)
-0.013
(0.018)
0.004
(0.017)
Constant -0.064
(0.108)
-0.058
(0.196)
0.072
(0.124)
0.283**
(0.130)
-0.066
(0.073)
Observations 182 47 46 43 46
R2 0.465 0.498 0.431 0.612 0.017
#None=0; Good-to-Bad=-1;Bad-to-Good=+1; *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%
without the induced motive for consumption smoothing.
We regress the change in the period-average price (Pt − Pt−1) on treatment dummies with BL as
the baseline treatment. We include additional regressors that we believe might affect the change in
prices across periods. They are, the change in the dividend state dummy (with no change = 0, Good-
to-Bad = −1, Bad-to-Good = +1) and the lagged excess demand, which is defined as (Bt−1 −Ot−1),
where Bt−1 is the total number of offers to buy (bids) and Ot−1 is the total number of offers to sell
in period t− 1; the period number. Column “Pooled” of Table 8 contains the estimated values of the
regression coefficients obtained from pooling the data from all treatments. The other columns contain
the regression results for each treatment. The estimates for CI and MM dummies in column “Pooled”
are significant and positive, implying that the size of the change in the average price between periods
is larger for sessions where Type-III and Type-IV traders are present.
The regression results show that prices have a significant predictable component and markets
populated with traders who have induced motive to smooth consumption have higher predictability.
Result 3: (i) Transaction prices co-move with the dividend state. That is, they are generally
higher in good dividend periods and lower in bad dividend periods. (ii) A larger proportion of the
variability of asset prices could be explained by the changes in the dividend state in the presence of
traders with the induced motive to smooth consumption.
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Table 9: OLS regression of change in period-average transaction price on change in state dummy.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Explanatory Variables Baseline Constant Income Mixed Market
Change in State Dummy# 0.755*** (0.113) 0.525*** (0.134) 0.620*** (0.088)
Constant -0.108 (0.072) 0.118 (0.071) 0.089 (0.076)
Number of Observations 47 46 43
R2 0.496 0.359 0.480
#None=0; Good-to-Bad=-1;Bad-to-Good=+1; ***significant at 1%
In the periods of good dividend, the average transaction prices are 5.28 for BL, 4.20 for CI and
5.73 for MM markets16. The prices are, however, 4.86, 4.59, 5.02 for BL, CI and MM treatment
respectively in the periods when no dividend is paid. This implies that the average transaction prices
are generally higher in good state periods, with an exception in CI markets17.
Table 9 presents the OLS regression of the change in the period-average transaction price on the
dummy variable of the change in the dividend state. The effect of a change in the dividend state
is substantial and significant (p < 0.001) in each treatment. The magnitude of the effect is higher
in sessions with the presence of Type-I and Type-II traders (0.755 in BL and 0.62 in MM ) than in
sessions where these traders are absent (0.525 in CI ). Changes in the dividend state explain roughly
50% of the variability of the asset prices in markets where traders of Type-I and Type-II are present
(R2 = 0.496 in BL and R2 = 0.48 in MM ). On the other hand, only roughly 36% of the variability of
asset prices is explained by changes in the dividend state when the market is populated by traders of
Type-III and Type-IV only.
In order to further understand the effect of dividend states on transaction prices, we classify
the differences in the dividend state in period t relative to that in period t − 1 into the following
categories: (1) Good-to-Bad, (2) Bad-to-Good, (3) Good-to-Good, and (4) Bad-to-Bad. We then
evaluate the change in the period-average price under these four categories. As is evident from Table
10, when the state changes from Good-to-Bad, prices go down significantly in each treatment. The
p-values from a Wilcoxon-signed rank test are 0.002, 0.084 and 0.001 for BL, CI and MM treatments,
respectively. Similarly, state changes from Bad-to-Good are accompanied by significant price increases
(with p-values < 0.01 in all of the three treatments). Comparing the magnitude of price changes across
Good-to-Bad and Bad-to-Good states, we find an asymmetric reaction. Prices fall more than they
16As there is only one state in CD sessions and price is fixed in FP treatment, we focus on the other three treatments
here.
17This is caused partly by the presence of a purely coincidental unbalanced distribution of dividend states across
periods. Recall that at the beginning of every period we draw randomly the dividend state, thus it is possible that either
a streak of bad or good dividend states is drawn in earlier periods. In our CI markets, it happened to be the case that
good dividend states were mostly realized in the early periods when the average transaction price was at a reasonably
moderate level and bad dividend states were mostly realized in the final periods when the average transaction price was
relatively high.
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Table 10: Change in average transaction prices, sub-divided by change in the dividend states.
Treatment Change in Dividend
State
Mean Standard
Deviation
p-value No. of obs.
Good-to-Bad -0.89 0.70 0.002 12
Baseline Bad-to-Bad -0.23 0.45 0.116 13
Good-to-Good 0.06 0.52 0.552 13
Bad-to-Good 0.61 0.26 0.008 9
Good-to-Bad -0.41 0.75 0.084 12
Constant Bad-to-Bad -0.11 0.36 0.465 4
Income Good-to-Good 0.16 0.29 0.008 20
Bad-to-Good 0.64 0.52 0.007 10
Good-to-Bad -0.49 0.35 0.001 14
Mixed Bad-to-Bad -0.39 0.33 0.043 7
Market Good-to-Good 0.26 0.51 0.046 13
Bad-to-Good 0.77 0.48 0.008 9
rise in markets where all traders have the induced motive to offset the income fluctuations between
periods (−0.89 vs. 0.61). In markets where traders having no income fluctuations are present, the
opposite is true (−0.41 vs. 0.64 for CI and −0.49 vs. 0.77 for MM ).
Prices do show a negative (positive) drift when the states in consecutive periods are Bad (Good).
While this drift is insignificant in our BL sessions (p-values> 0.1), the upward movement in prices
is significant in the CI treatment when the successive periods experience good dividends. Both,
the downward trend when the consecutive periods experience bad dividends and the upward trend
when the consecutive periods experience good dividends, are significant in the MM treatment (p-
values< 0.05). The significant momentum in prices despite the state persistence in the CI and MM
sessions imply that, in addition to the change in the dividend state, there are other forces at play that
drive price to change between periods.
As shown previously in Table 8, the coefficient estimates for the “lagged excess demand” variable
in CI and MM treatments are positively significant, albeit rather small in magnitude. This means
that a market in which bids (asks) substantially exceed the asks (bids) tends to display increasing
(decreasing) prices. This pattern has been documented in several earlier studies that investigate
bubbles and crashes in experimental markets (Smith et al. (1988), Lei et al. (2001)). What makes our
finding interesting is that we only observe this pattern in CI and MM treatments. These are sessions
where Type-III and Type-IV traders, who do not have any income fluctuations across periods, are
present. Thus, the excess demand in period t − 1 happens to be a significant predictor of the price
changes in period t only when the market is populated with at least some traders having no induced
motive to trade. In contrast, when all traders have an induced motive to smooth consumption as a
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result of income fluctuations across periods (as in treatments BL and CD), the lagged excess demand
ceases to affect price changes significantly. Tables 8 and 9 together present a coherent effect of the
“lagged excess demand” variable in explaining the change in period-average transaction prices. The
addition of this variable as a regressor considerably increases the R2 in CI and MM treatments (0.359
to 0.431 and 0.48 to 0.612, respectively). However, the R2 remains unchanged in the BL treatment.
4.3 Trading activity
Given the presence of traders who have induced motive to trade in each period in order to neutralize
the income shocks they experience, we would expect trading volumes to be relatively high in treatments
BL, MM, CD and FP. This is because in these treatments, traders with strong desire to trade in order
to smooth consumption across periods are present. Obviously, consumption smoothing is not the only
thing that motivates traders to trade. The pursuit of capital gains through speculative trading is
also another important motive. This implies that even in the absence of induced motive to smooth
consumption in order to neutralize the income shock (e.g. in our CI sessions), trading volumes could
still be high. This is something that can also be found in the standard setting of Smith et al. (1988)
where the income-shock induced motive to smooth consumption is absent. Result 4 below summarizes
the observations of the trading activities.
Result 4: There are substantial trades in each period and across treatments. Compared to
the baseline, more trades take place in treatments without dividend uncertainty or with fixed prices.
Trading activity is higher when the dividend state is good than when it is bad.
The average trading volume, measured as the number of securities bought and sold, per period
for each treatment is listed in Table 11. In all treatments, there is substantially large trading and the
volume is visibly higher for periods 1 and 2 (initial periods). Since the average supply is 200 assets,
this means 10%− 15% of available securities are traded in each period. In the CD treatment, trading
volume is higher than in the other treatments BL, CI and MM. We also find evidence that having
a constant dividend results in a lower variance of trading activity in the market. Compared to the
baseline, the trading volume is also considerably higher for the FP sessions.
Table 11, however, does not present the correct numbers for purposes of comparison of trading
activity across treatments for two reasons. First, the absolute levels of prices are different across
treatments and hence, this might influence the total number of transactions each period. Second, in
the FP treatment, participants could buy from or sell to the experimenter at a fixed price. Thus,
the numbers for FP sessions in Table 11 should be divided by half before any comparison with other
treatments is made. We compute the dollar value of transactions per trader in each period that
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Table 11: Trading volume across treatments.
Periods BL CI MM CD FP
1 and 2
Mean 25.7 37.3 29.9 35.7 97.8
St. Dev. 8.3 10.2 12.8 6.2 23.5
Min. 11 17 9 23 54
Max. 46 65 56 51 134
≥3
Mean 22.4 24.4 20.4 32.6 90.4
St. Dev. 9.0 8.7 9.3 6.6 26.8
Min. 8 11 7 18 29
Max. 42 41 47 49 163
Table 12: Value of transactions per trader: average across periods. Data for all periods as well as for
periods following the dividend state (bad or good) is presented (standard deviation are in parentheses).
Treatment All periods Periods following
a Bad state
Periods following
a Good state
Baseline 6.83 (2.74) 4.93 (1.65) 8.36 (2.49)
Constant Income 6.92 (2.17) 5.54 (1.62) 7.49 (2.13)
Mixed Market 8.02 (4.13) 4.66 (1.63) 10.37 (3.71)
Constant Dividend 8.29 (2.52) - -
Fixed Price 7.25 (2.02) 7.07 (2.25) 7.44 (1.78)
takes into account the above two factors18. This could be interpreted as the amount of cash that
is exchanged per trader every period. Table 12 gives the average value of transactions per trader in
each of the treatments. Compared to baseline sessions, where both price uncertainty and dividend
uncertainty are present, the value of transactions is higher in sessions without dividend uncertainty or
price uncertainty. However, the difference is significant only for CD treatment (MW p-value=0.002)
but not for FP treatment (MW p-value=0.116).
As Table 12 shows, trading activity is higher in periods with the asset paying a dividend of 1 ECU
than in periods when the asset pays nothing as dividend. This is expected because in Good times
traders have more cash and they engage in dealings where a larger amount of cash exchange hands.
While the activity is significantly greater in sessions BL, CI and CD (with MW p-values < 0.001),
the difference is insignificant for the sessions with no price uncertainty and no liquidity uncertainty
(MW p-value=0.539).
18In order to facilitate comparison with other treatments, we assign 1/2 weight to the purchase/sale of an unit of the
asset in FP sessions.
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4.4 Consumption smoothing, speculative transactions and trader strategies
Average consumption for each type of trader in respective treatments is shown in Figure 3. The
solid lines denote average consumption in data and the dotted lines capture the average consumption
under autarky (no trade)19. Compared to the fluctuations in consumption over time under autarky,
the fluctuations in consumption are far less for Types-I and II. This shows evidence of consumption
smoothing over odd and even periods in an attempt to offset the income fluctuations experienced by
these traders. It is also evident from Figure 3 that Types-III and IV do not engage in consumption
smoothing. These traders have constant income and thus have no fluctuation in wealth due to income
shocks.
Figure 3: Average consumption for each type of trader in the five treatments. Solid lines denote
average consumption in the data and dotted lines denote average consumption under autarky.
The visual impression obtained from Figure 3 is corroborated by Table 13 which provides the
detailed entries of the average consumption across dividend states and across even/odd periods along
with their autarky counterparts. After trade, the difference in consumption between odd and even
19The autarky values for consumption of different types of agents depends on states, except in CD sessions. We use
the sequence of realized states across all sessions to compute their autarky consumption.
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Table 13: Average consumption across dividend states and across even/odd periods. Autarky numbers
are in parentheses.
Treatment Trader Type Dividend State Period
Bad Good Even Odd
Baseline Type I 9.52 (8.40) 24.57 (25.32) 19.36 (23.80) 16.63 (12.90)
Type II 5.48 (6.60) 15.43 (14.68) 6.64 (2.20) 14.50 (18.23)
Constant Type III 9.71 (7.50) 26.90 (27.50) 18.97 (18.33) 24.17 (24.27)
Income Type IV 5.29 (7.50) 13.10 (12.50) 9.57 (10.21) 11.80 (11.69)
Type I 9.49 (8.57) 25.98 (25.50) 20.85 (24.57) 17.82 (13.57)
Mixed Type II 5.59 (6.43) 14.50 (14.50) 7.60 (2.39) 13.49 (18.39)
Market Type III 9.72 (7.50) 26.19 (27.50) 17.92 (17.07) 20.62 (21.07)
Type IV 5.14 (7.50) 13.47 (12.50) 7.83 (9.89) 11.85 (10.89)
Constant - - 20.17 (25.00) 14.81 (10.00)
Dividend Type II - - 7.33 (2.50) 12.69 (17.50)
Fixed Type I 14.66 (9.23) 19.78 (25.19) 18.36 (22.20) 16.17 (12.59)
Price Type II 8.97 (5.77) 11.19 (14.81) 9.59 (1.80) 10.53 (18.15)
periods is considerably lesser than the corresponding difference under autarky for Type-I and II traders.
This pattern is however, not observed for Type-III and IV agents, with Type-IV agents showing signs
of anti-consumption smoothing behavior. These observations are consistent across treatments. The
main finding with respect to consumption smoothing conduct is summarized in the next result.
Result 5: Traders with income fluctuations in alternating periods smooth consumption over time
and traders with constant income between periods do not engage in consumption smoothing activity.
Table 14 provides the magnitude of the difference in consumption between even and odd periods
as well as the difference between these even and odd periods and their respective autarky consumption,
with each replication being a unit of observation20. Regardless of the characteristic of the asset market,
for Type-I and Type-II agents, the (absolute) differences in consumption across even/odd periods after
trading are statistically smaller than the differences in consumption across periods under autarky. For
these traders, the p-values from Wilcoxon rank-sum test are < 0.05 in BL and MM sessions and < 0.01
in CD sessions. In contrast, these numbers are not statistically different for traders with constant
income (with p-values > 0.1). For Type-IV traders, the difference in consumption across periods is in
fact significantly higher than the difference in consumption under autarky for MM treatment (p-value
< 0.05).
Further evidence is obtained from Table 15 which presents, for each type of agent, the values
for net changes in assets per trader across the change in dividend states and across even and odd
20To compute these differences, we ignore replications which last only for one period.
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Table 14: Difference in within-replication consumption between odd and even period.
Treatment Type of Trader Trade Autarky SR p-value No. of obs.
Baseline Type I -2.07 -10.53 0.018 7
Type II 7.65 16.12 0.018 7
Constant Type III 2.97 3.45 0.612 7
Income Type IV 1.35 0.86 0.612 7
Type I -1.99 -9.39 0.018 7
Mixed Type II 8.86 16.4 0.043 7
Market Type III 1.98 5.61 0.176 7
Type IV 4.87 1.4 0.028 7
Constant Type I -5.52 -15 0.002 12
Dividend Type II 5.52 15 0.002 12
Fixed Type I -1.66 -6.06 0.093 8
Price Type II 0.27 17.23 0.012 8
periods. As is evident from the table, Type-I traders are net buyers (sellers) of assets in even (odd)
periods. That is, on average, they purchase assets when the income shock is positive and sell assets
in periods when there is no income. Type-II agents have the opposite pattern. They are net buyers
(sellers) of assets in odd (even) periods. For these traders, the entries also show that the magnitude of
the net change in assets per trader is higher in treatments without dividend uncertainty and without
price uncertainty. Type-III agents who do not experience income fluctuations between periods and
are asset-rich are net sellers of assets in even as well as odd periods. On the other hand, Type-IV
agents who also have constant income, but are asset-poor accumulate securities over time. Thus, they
are predominantly net purchasers of assets.
Next, we turn our focus on the behavior of different types of traders in mixed markets which
are more representative of markets outside the laboratory than any of the other treatments. In MM
sessions, all four types of traders are present which allows us to rank these different types of traders
in terms of their activity in the marketplace. We also find evidence of one type of trader being able to
exploit the price predictability as reported earlier. The next result characterizes behavior of traders
in the mixed markets.
Result 6: In markets where all types of traders are present, the asset-poor traders with income
fluctuations are the most active, followed by the asset-rich traders with income fluctuations. Asset-rich
traders with constant income are the least active. Asset-poor traders with constant income capitalizes
on the predictability of prices by buying when prices are lower (as state changes from Good-to-Bad)
and selling when prices are higher (as state changes from Bad-to-Good).
Table 15 shows that the absolute value of the net change in assets in even and odd periods taken
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Table 15: Net change in assets, across change in states and across even and odd periods.
Treatment Trader Type Change in State Period
Good-to-Bad Bad-to-Good Even Odd
Baseline Type I 0.17 0.04 0.86 -1.03
Type II -0.17 -0.04 -0.86 1.03
Constant Type III -0.56 0.10 -0.21 -0.07
Income Type IV 0.56 -0.10 0.21 0.07
Type I 0.02 -0.17 0.53 -1.13
Mixed Type II -0.18 0.73 -0.80 1.32
Market Type III -0.46 -0.28 -0.18 -0.18
Type IV 0.64 -0.31 0.43 0.04
Constant Type I - - 1.03 -1.53
Dividend Type II - - -1.03 1.53
Fixed Type I -1.97 1.81 1.15 -2.49
Price Type II -2.23 1.28 -3.08 2.78
altogether is the highest for Type-II traders, followed by Type-I traders (2.12 vs. 1.66, respectively).
The value is 0.36 for Type-III traders, thereby making them the least active of all agents. This is
expected because these traders have no income fluctuation and hence there is no induced motive to
trade in order to offset the variability in income. Also, these traders are asset-rich with relatively high
number of assets as endowment. Thus, Type-III traders are most comfortably placed compared to
other agents and hence have the least incentive to trade. While Type-I and Type-II agents engage in
consumption smoothing across even/odd periods, Type-III traders are net sellers of assets over time.
Most striking observation is with respect to behavior exhibited by Type-IV traders. As is evident
from Table 15, these traders are net buyer (seller) of assets when the state changes from Good-to-Bad
(Bad-to-Good). We already know (from Result 3) that prices have a significant predictable component.
It seems that Type-IV agents are able to make use of this predictability and systematically exploit
it. The strategy is a potential explanation for the observed anti-consumption behavior. For traders of
type-IV, income fluctuations come mainly from the changes in the dividend distribution. Instead of
buying (selling) assets when they experience high (low) income due to change in states from Bad-to-
Good (Good-to-Bad), agents IV sell (buy) their assets, thus resulting in exacerbation of the income
gap between high and low income periods.
It might be true that Types-I and II are aware of the price predictability but are unable to
capitalize on it as they are constrained to use the asset market for the sole purpose of consumption
smoothing (the primary motivation for engaging in a trade for agents with income shocks). These
traders (Types-I and II), being aware that there would be low income in the next period, would
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attempt to transfer wealth to the period of scarcity. As cash is perishable, the only way to transfer
wealth to the next period is by increasing the inventory of the long-lived asset. Thus, agents might
be willing to accept a lower rate of return in order to smooth consumption.
A vast majority of the naturally occurring markets are likely to have both types of traders: those
who use the asset market to offset their income variability and those who are in the marketplace
for capital gains by engaging in speculative trades. The above discussion implies that even though
prices have a significant predictable component and that the predictability of price is vulnerable for
exploitation by the speculative traders, the presence of agents who are in the marketplace only to
smooth their intertemporal consumption ensures that the predictability does not wither away.
So far, we have discussed consumption smoothing in the context of offsetting income variation
between periods. However, there could be another dimension along which agents might attempt to
equalize consumption. Individuals might want to balance consumption in Good and Bad dividend
states. While this would require quite a sophisticated strategy to be used by agents, the next result
argues that this was indeed the case in the FP sessions. Taking away the price and liquidity uncertainty,
thereby making the environment merely dependent on that of an individual decision making task
facilitates the formation of a smooth stream of consumption.
Result 7: In the absence of price uncertainty and liquidity uncertainty, traders’ choices reveal
preference for consumption smoothing over time and across dividend states.
Table 13 numbers for the FP treatment lend support to the current result. Consumption smooth-
ing across odd/even periods is very close to being perfect. For Type-I traders, the difference in average
consumption across periods is only 2.19 as opposed to 9.61 under autarky. For Type-II traders, this
difference is even smaller (0.94 in contrast to 16.35 under autarky). The difference in consumption
between odd and even periods under trading and autarky within a replication are statistically signifi-
cant for both types of traders (p-values from Wilcoxon rank-sum test are < 0.1 for Type-I agents and
< 0.05 for Type-II agents; see Table 14).
In addition to consumption smoothing over time across even and odd periods, Table 13 also
presents evidence for consumption smoothing across Good and Bad states. The gap in average con-
sumption across dividend states is only 5.12 as opposed to 15.96 under autarky for Type-I traders
while the difference is only 2.22 in contrast to 9.04 under autarky for Type-II traders. This provides
strong empirical evidence that individuals show preference for a smooth stream of consumption, not
only to offset the income variability between periods but also to offset the wealth swings due to (ex-
ogenous) realization of the dividend state. In other treatments, the inability of traders to smooth
consumption across the dividend states is possibly due to the limitation imposed by the asset market,
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Table 16: OLS regression of δi.
Explanatory Variables Coefficient Estimate Standard Error
Constant Income -0.082* 0.043
Low Initial Asset 0.125*** 0.026
Constant Income × Low
Initial Asset
-0.331*** 0.054
Mixed Market -0.033 0.035
Constant Dividend 0.05 0.035
Fixed Price 0.066** 0.031
Risk -0.001 0.006
Gender 0.004 0.024
Constant 0.601*** 0.044
Observations 238
R2 0.44
*significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%
including the fact that prices are not fixed and hence must be forecasted by agents. In the FP ses-
sions, individuals do not face any uncertainty with respect to prices or trading which makes it easier
for them to smooth consumption. It should be noted, however, that the total number of assets in the
economy is not constant in the FP treatment unlike that in the other treatments. Hence there are
several contributing factors to the additional dimension of consumption smoothing behavior observed
in FP against all other treatments.
The value for the change in net assets further corroborates the above result. On average, traders
buy assets when they experience positive income shock in even periods for Type-I and odd periods for
Type-II, as well as when the state changes from Bad-to-Good. Similarly, agents sell assets when they
experience no income shock and also when the state changes from Good-to-Bad.
Next, we seek to identify the main aspects affecting the consumption smoothing behavior of
traders. First, we define a consumption smoothing strategy. Specifically, trading of individual i in
period t exhibits a consumption smoothing strategy (i.e. γit equal to 1) if c
i
t < (>) y
i
t + dta
i
t−1 when
yit + dta
i
t−1 > (<) yit−1 + dt−1ait−2, where cit is the final cash (consumption) at the end of period t, yit
is the exogenous income given to individual i at the start of period t, dt is the dividend paid per unit
of the asset at the start of period t, and ait−1 denotes the number of assets held at the start of period
t. In other words, an agent reduces consumption fluctuations if he buys (sells) assets when his wealth
increases (decreases) in period t. We define δi = 1T
T∑
t=1
γit as the proportion of individual per-period
actions that are consistent with the consumption smoothing behavior. Thus, δi gives the extent of
individual consumption smoothing.
Our final result summarizes the factors that provide an impetus to the activity of consumption
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smoothing. To support the result, we estimate an OLS model with δi as the dependent variable.
There are several indicator variables as independent variables, namely; ‘constant income’, that takes a
value of 1 if there is no induced income fluctuation between periods and 0 otherwise, ‘low initial asset’,
that takes a value of 1 if asset-poor and 0 otherwise, an interaction between ‘constant income’ and
‘low initial asset’, ‘mixed market’, that takes a value of 1 for MM session and 0 otherwise, ‘constant
dividend’, that takes a value of 1 for CD session and 0 otherwise, and ‘fixed price’, that takes a value
of 1 for FP session and 0 otherwise21. Table 16 presents the coefficient estimates from the regression,
based on which we make the following observation.
Result 8: The percentage of transactions consistent with consumption smoothing behavior is
higher when traders have fluctuating income process and relatively lower initial assets. This percentage
is also larger when prices are fixed as opposed to endogenously determined prices.
As is evident from Table 16, the coefficient on ‘constant income’ is negative and significant (at
10% level). Thus, the absence of income fluctuations between periods has a negative effect on δi.
The positively significant coefficient (p-value < 0.01) on ‘low initial asset’ imply that if traders are
asset-poor as opposed to asset-rich then a higher fraction of transactions could be classified as being
consistent with consumption smoothing activity. However, it should be noted that asset-poor traders
include both Types-II and IV traders and hence not much could be interpreted from this coefficient.
The primary validation for the result comes from the coefficient on the interaction between ‘con-
stant income’ and ‘low initial asset’ which is highly significant (p-value < 0.01) and negative. The
marginal effect of having no income fluctuation is −0.41 (−0.08) if the trader is asset-poor (asset-
rich). This implies that the effect of income fluctuations between periods on consumption smoothing
is enormous when the trader is asset-poor (Type-II versus Type-IV). This effect is however, mild (but
significant) when only asset-rich traders are considered (Type-I vs. III). Also, the marginal effect of
lower initial asset endowment is +0.13 when traders have income fluctuations and −0.20 when traders
have constant income each period. Thus, being asset-poor affects consumption smoothing positively
for traders having income fluctuations: more transactions are consistent with consumption smoothing
behavior for Type-II agents than Type-I individuals. On the other hand, being endowed with lower
initial assets has a negative effect on minimizing consumption variability for traders having constant
income: less transactions are consistent with consumption smoothing behavior for Type-IV agents
than Type-III traders.
Thus, from the above discussion we conclude that the relative ranking of the various types of
21In addition, a constant and two other variables: ‘risk’ (values from the risk elicitation task are used on a scale of
1-11 with 1 as highly risk-loving and 11 if highly risk-averse) and ‘gender’ (1 if male and 0 otherwise) are included as
well.
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traders in terms of the extent of consumption smoothing, as measured by δi, is as follows: Type-
II>Type-I>Type-III>Type-IV. Finally, a positive and significant coefficient on ‘fixed price’ suggests
that removing price uncertainty has a favorable effect on consumption smoothing22.
5 Conclusion
We implemented an indefinite horizon economy in the laboratory with a single perishable consumption
good in each period. The incentive to smooth consumption over time was provided to some individuals
by subjecting them to income shocks. Agents could use the asset market in order to offset income fluc-
tuations or engage in speculative trading. Thus, the setting was reminiscent of the consumption-based
asset pricing models that are widely popular in macroeconomics/finance. Within this controlled envi-
ronment, we studied the effect of the composition of asset market in terms of the proportion of traders
with induced motive to smooth consumption on asset price dynamics and consumption smoothing
behavior. We also investigated the implications of dividend uncertainty and price uncertainty in this
setting. We believe that our research would complement the analysis of asset pricing that uses field
data. Our findings are summarized below.
We observe that the transaction prices are higher compared to the (constant) risk-neutral fun-
damental value in all our treatments. The extent of mispricing is severe and the magnitude of the
price change between periods is greater in the presence of traders without induced motive to smooth
consumption. Prices co-move with the dividend state, thereby showing that prices have a significant
predictable component. As the dividend process is perfectly observable in experiments, we are able to
measure the exact proportion of the variability of asset prices explained by changes in the dividend
state. While there is price predictability in all our treatments, it is higher in the presence of traders
with induced motive to smooth consumption. In sessions where traders with constant income are
present, prices are also affected by the lagged excess demand: a market thick (thin) with bids relative
to asks tends to display increasing (decreasing) prices.
We find that there is substantial trade in our experiment. This is true even for the sessions where
only traders with constant income are present. So, even without the presence of traders who have
induced motive to trade, agents engage in asset exchanges. A higher amount of activity takes place
when the dividend state is Good than when it is Bad, driven partly by the fact that prices are higher
in periods with Good states than without. We also find strong evidence for consumption smoothing
behavior for those who have induced motive to do so. Agents having a constant stream of income
22Further support is obtained from a separate regression with δi as the dependent variable, BL as the default treatment
and indicator variables for other treatments.
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each period do not engage in smoothing their consumption relative to autarky.
In markets where various types of traders are involved, individuals having income fluctuations over
time are the ones who are most active. Agents having a constant income each period and relatively
higher initial units of the security participate the least. Unconstrained by the requirement to smooth
consumption in the wake of income fluctuations between periods, traders with constant income over
time and relatively lower initial endowment of assets are able to exploit the predictability of prices by
buying low and selling high where the high and low prices are governed by the change in underlying
dividend process.
When prices are fixed and in the absence of liquidity uncertainty, individuals show preference for
consumption smoothing not only over time but across dividend states as well. Eliminating uncertain-
ties with regards to trading thus has a positive effect on overall consumption smoothing behavior of
agents experiencing income fluctuations.
There are several avenues to pursue in future research. First, developing a theoretical model that
considers the co-existence of different types of traders (with and without the induced motive to smooth
consumption) is a potentially fruitful endeavor. Within this setting, generating predictions on asset
price dynamics as a function of the proportion of traders with induced motive to smooth consumption
would be insightful. Second, future experiments could inform us about the implications of introducing
income growth in our setting, thereby creating the possibility of “rational” bubbles. Third, all of the
experimental studies (including ours) that investigate markets populated with traders with induced
motive to smooth consumption in order to offset income fluctuations consider long-lived bonds. With
the exception of some perpetual bonds issued by the British treasury in the 19th century, these
infinite-horizon bonds do not exist and are no longer issued23. It would be interesting to implement
infinite-horizon economies in the laboratory with finite-maturity bonds within the framework of a
dynamic general equilibrium asset-pricing model24.
References
[1] Asparouhova, E., Bossaerts, P. and Plott, C. R. (2003), “Excess demand and equilibration in
multi-security financial markets: the empirical evidence,” Journal of Financial Markets, 6, 1-21.
[2] Asparouhova, E., Bossaerts, P., Roy, N. and Zame, W. (2016), “‘Lucas’ in the laboratory,” Journal
of Finance, forthcoming.
23See Calvo and Guidotti (1992) for a theory of government debt structure that explains why modern governments do
not issue infinite-horizon bonds.
24Judd et al. (2011) provide a theoretical analysis of complex bond portfolios in such a setting.
29
[3] Balvers, R. J., Cosimano, T. F. and McDonald, B. (1990), “Predicting stock returns in an efficient
market,” Journal of Finance, 45, 1109-1128.
[4] Bernard, V. L. and Thomas, J. K. (1989), “Post-earnings-announcement drift: delayed price
response or risk premium?,” Journal of Accounting Research, 27, 1-36.
[5] Bossaerts, P. and Plott, C. R. (2002), “The CAPM in thin experimental financial markets,”
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 26, 1093-1112.
[6] Bossaerts, P., Plott, C. R. and Zame, W. (2007), “Prices and portfolio choices in financial markets:
theory, econometrics, experiments,” Econometrica, 75, 993-1038.
[7] Breeden, D. T. (1979), “An intertemporal asset pricing model with stochastic consumption and
investment opportunities,” Journal of Financial Economics, 7, 265-296.
[8] Caginalp, G., Porter, D. and Smith, V. L. (1998), “Initial cash/asset ratio and asset prices: an
experimental study,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 95, 756-761.
[9] Calvo, G. A. and Guidotti, P. E. (1992), “Optimal maturity of nominal government debt: an
infinite-horizon model,” International Economic Review, 33, 895-919.
[10] Camerer, C. F. and Weigelt, K. (1996), “An asset market test of a mechanism for inducing
stochastic horizons in experiments,” in Research in Experimental Economics, 6, 1996, R.M. Isaac
(ed.), JAI Press: Greenwich, CT, 213-238.
[11] Campbell, J. Y. and Shiller, R. J. (1988), “The dividend-price ratio and expectations of future
dividends and discount factors,” Review of Financial Studies, 1, 195-228.
[12] Cecchetti, S. G., Lam, P-S., and Mark, N. C. (1990), “Mean reversion in equilibrium asset prices,”
American Economic Review, 80, 398-418.
[13] Crockett, S. and Duffy, J. (2015), “An experimental test of the Lucas asset pricing model,”
Working paper.
[14] Daniel, K., Hirshleifer, D. and Subrahmanyam, A. (1998), “Investor psychology and security
market under- and overreactions,” Journal of Finance, 53, 1839-1885.
[15] De Bondt, W. F. M. and Thaler, R. (1985), “Does the stock market overreact?,” Journal of
Finance, 40, 793-805.
[16] De Long, J. B., Shleifer, A., Summers, L. H. and Waldmann, R. J. (1990), “Positive feedback
investment strategies and destabilizing rational speculation,” Journal of Finance, 45, 379-395.
30
[17] Dufwenberg, M., Lindqvist, T. and Moore, E. (2005), “Bubbles and experience: an experiment,”
American Economic Review, 95, 1731-1737.
[18] Duxbury, D. (1995), “Experimental asset markets within finance,” Journal of Economic Surveys,
9, 331-371.
[19] Fama, E. F. (1990), “Stock returns, expected returns, and real activity,” Journal of Finance, 45,
1089-1108.
[20] Fama, E. F. and French, K. R. (1988), “Dividend yields and expected stock returns,” Journal of
Financial Economics, 22, 3-25.
[21] Fischbacher, U. (2007), “z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments,” Experi-
mental Economics, 10, 171-178.
[22] Forsythe, R., Palfrey, T. R. and Plott, C. R. (1982), “Asset valuation in an experimental market,”
Econometrica, 50, 537-567.
[23] Friedman, D., Harrison, G. W. and Salmon, J. W. (1984), “The informational efficiency of ex-
perimental asset markets,” Journal of Political Economy, 92, 349-408.
[24] Friedman, M. (1957), A theory of the consumption function, Princeton University Press.
[25] Haruvy, E. and Noussair, C. N. (2006), “The effect of short selling on bubbles and crashes in
experimental spot asset markets,” Journal of Finance, 61, 1119-1157.
[26] Haruvy, E., Lahav, Y. and Noussair, C. N. (2007), “Traders’ expectations in asset markets:
experimental evidence,” American Economic Review, 97, 1901-1920.
[27] Holt, C. A. and Laury, S. K. (2002), “Risk aversion and incentive effects,” American Economic
Review, 92, 1644-1655.
[28] Hussam, R. N., Porter, D. and Smith, V. L. (2008), “Thar she blows: can bubbles be rekindled
with experienced subjects?,” American Economic Review, 98, 924-937.
[29] Judd, K. L., Kubler, F. and Schmedders, K. (2011), “Bond ladders and optimal portfolios,”
Review of Financial Studies, 24, 4123-4166.
[30] King, R. R., Smith, V. L., Williams, A. W. and Van Boening, M. V. (1993), “The robustness
of bubbles and crashes in experimental stock markets,” in R. Day and P. Chen, eds., Nonlinear
Dynamics and Evolutionary Economics, Oxford University Press.
31
[31] Kirchler, M., Huber, J. and Stockl, T. (2012), “Thar she bursts: reducing confusion reduces
bubbles,” American Economic Review, 102, 865-883.
[32] Lei, V., Noussair, C. N. and Plott, C. R. (2001), “Nonspeculative bubbles in experimental asset
markets: lack of common knowledge of rationality vs. actual irrationality,” Econometrica, 69,
831-859.
[33] LeRoy, S. F. and Porter, R. D. (1981), “The present-value relation: tests based on implied variance
bounds,” Econometrica, 49, 555-574.
[34] Lo, A. W., and MacKinlay, A. C. (1988), “Stock market prices do not follow random walks:
evidence from a simple specification test,” Review of Financial Studies, 1, 41-66.
[35] Lucas, R. E. Jr. (1978), “Asset prices in an exchange economy,” Econometrica, 46, 1429-1445.
[36] Malkiel, B. G. (1999), A Random Walk Down Wall Street: Including a Life-Cycle Guide to
Personal Investing, W.W. Norton, New York, NY.
[37] Plott, C. R. and Smith, V. L. (2008), Eds., Handbook of Experimental Economic Results, Vol. 1,
Amsterdam: North Holland.
[38] Plott, C. R. and Sunder, S. (1982), ”Efficiency of experimental security markets with insider
information: An application of rational-expectation models,” Journal of Political Economy, 90,
663-698.
[39] Porter, D. P. and Smith, V. L. (1995), “Futures contracting and dividend uncertainty in experi-
mental asset markets,” Journal of Business, 68, 509-541.
[40] Samuelson, P. A. (1973), “Proof that properly discounted present values of assets vibrate ran-
domly,” The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 4, 369-374.
[41] Shiller, R. J. (1981), “Do stock prices move too much to be justified by subsequent changes in
dividends?,” American Economic Review, 71, 421-436.
[42] Smith, V. L. (1962), “An experimental study of competitive market behavior,” Journal of Political
Economy, 70, 111-137.
[43] Smith, V. L., Suchanek, G. L. and Williams, A. W. (1988), “Bubbles, crashes and endogenous
expectations in experimental spot asset markets,” Econometrica, 56, 1119-1151.
[44] Stiglitz, J. E. (1970), “A consumption-oriented theory of the demand for financial assets and the
term structure of interest rates,” Review of Economic Studies, 37, 321-351.
32
[45] Sunder, S. (1995), “Experimental asset markets: a survey,” in A. E. Roth and J. H. Kagel, eds.,
The Handbook of Experimental Economics, Vol. 1, 445-500, Princeton University Press.
[46] Van Boening, M. V., Williams, A. W. and LaMaster, S. (1993), “Price bubbles and crashes in
experimental call markets,” Economics Letters, 41, 179-185.
33
A Experimental Instructions (For Online Publication)
GENERAL INFORMATION
Dear participant, welcome to our experiment. Please pay attention to the information
provided here and make your decisions carefully. If at any time you have questions,
please raise your hand and we will attend to you in private.
Please note that unauthorized communication is prohibited. Failure to adhere to this rule would
force us to stop the simulation and you may be held liable for the cost incurred in this simulation.
You have the right to withdraw from the study at any point in time, and if you decide to do so your
payments earned will be forfeited.
By participating in this study, you will be able to earn a considerable amount of money. The
amount depends on the decisions you make.
At the end of this session, this money will be paid to you privately and in cash. It would
be contained in an envelope (indicated with your unique user ID) together with a payment receipt
acknowledging that you have been given the correct payment amount.
Each of you will be given a unique user ID and your anonymity will be preserved for the
study. You will only be identified by your user ID in our data collection. All information collected
will strictly be kept confidential for the sole purpose of this study.
TRADING STAGE
In this experiment, we are going to create an auction market in which you will trade units of
a fictitious asset (hereinafter referred to as ‘securities’) that earn dividend for every period. Please
note that all securities are identical.
The currency used in this market is called ECU (Experimental Currency Unit), which will be
converted to Singapore dollars for your payment at the end of this stage with the following exchange
rate:
To better understand the instruction below, please refer to Appendix A-1 and A-2 given to you.
1. Duration of the experiment
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This experimental session consists of a number of replications of the same situation, referred to
as trading rounds. One round consists of a number of periods. Each period lasts for 120 seconds.
The total number of rounds is not known beforehand. Instead, we determine whether the current
round continues in the following manner. We will draw a random number using a dice. If the
number drawn is 1-5, we then proceed to the next period within the current round. If
the number drawn is 6, the current round will terminate and the first period of a new
round will start.
Notice that the termination chance is time-invariant; it does not depend on how long the experi-
ment has been going.
Prior to the real trading game, there will be a trial round consisting of 3 trading periods for you
to practice.
Below is the illustration of the relationship between trading rounds and periods:
2. Dividend and Fundamental Value of the Securities
[The following paragraph in all treatments except the ‘Constant Dividend’ treatment ] At the be-
ginning of a period, each security in your inventory will be awarded dividend. The dividend income
is added to your cash inventories immediately before trading starts. There are two possible dividend
values per security: 0 or 1 ECU with equal probability of being drawn. Past dividends have no in-
fluence on this chance. In each period the value of dividend is drawn by the computer randomly and
will only be announced at the beginning of that period. The dividend is the same for each security
and for each participant. The expected value of the dividend drawn in every period is
E(Dividend) = (0× 0.5) + (1× 0.5) = 0.5 ECU
[The following paragraph only in the ‘Constant Dividend’ treatment ] At the beginning of a period,
each security in your inventory will be awarded dividend, and dividend income is added to your cash
inventories immediately before trading starts. The dividends are always 0.5 ECUs. The dividend is
the same for each security and for each participant.
Since there is a 1/6 chance that the round ends in the period when a security is bought and
the maturity of the security is indefinite, the fundamental value of the security can be calculated as
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follows:
Hence, the fundamental value of a security is 2.5 ECUs.
3. Market Description
There are 16 traders in the market. At the start of each round, you will be allocated securities
which you can trade in the market.
[The following sentences only for traders of type I and type III ] You will start this round with 20
securities. Other traders may start with different initial allocations.
[The following sentences only for traders of type II and type IV ] You will start this round with 5
securities. Other traders may start with different initial allocations.
There will be two sources of fresh cash injection in each period. First, the securities you hold
at the end of the previous period may pay dividends at the beginning of the next period. These
dividends will be your source of cash in the next period. An exception would be for the first period
of every round, where the dividend will always be 1 ECU. In subsequent periods, dividend value
will be randomly determined.
Second, at the beginning of a period, you may be given income.
[The following paragraph only for traders of type I ] You will receive income in every alternate
period. In odd periods (1st, 3rd, ...) you will receive nothing. In even periods (2nd, 4th, ...) you
will receive 15 ECUs. This income is added to your cash inventory at the beginning of every new
period. It will be made known beforehand in which periods you will receive income. Others may
have a different income flow.
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[The following paragraph only for traders of type II ] You will receive income in every alternate
period. In odd periods (1st, 3rd, ...) you will receive 15 ECUs. In even periods (2nd, 4th, ...) you
will receive nothing. This income is added to your cash inventory at the beginning of every new
period. It will be made known beforehand in which periods you will receive income. Others may
have a different income flow.
[The following paragraph only for traders of type III and type IV ] You will receive 7.5 ECUs as
income in every period. This income is added to your cash inventory at the beginning of every new
period. It will be made known beforehand in which periods you will receive income. Others may
have a different income flow.
All in all, your total cash at the end of each period will be the sum of the dividend payment you
receive from your securities, the income you receive for that period and the profit from trading. It is
important to note that your cash in one period will expire and will not be carried forward
to the next period; while your securities will always be carried over to the next period.
However, securities expire at the end of each round and will not be carried forward to
the next round.
Note that within a round, you will therefore only receive securities endowment once at the start
of the round. However, you will likely receive income more than once depending on the number of
periods in that round.
4. Rules of the Experimental Market (Please refer to schematic diagram in Appendix A-3)
[The following information in all treatments except FP ]
Trade is conducted in the form of a double auction market. During the trading period, you may
buy or sell securities or you may do nothing. The trading is anonymous.
Basic concept of Bid and Ask:
The Bid price: represents the price that a buyer is willing to pay for a security.
The Ask price: represents the price that a seller is willing to receive for a security.
A trade or transaction occurs when the buyer and seller agree on (accept a Bid/accept an Ask)
a price for the security.
Example:
Submit a Bid at x1 ECU : means you are willing to buy a security at x1 ECU.
Submit an Ask at y1 ECU : means you are willing to sell a security at y1 ECU.
Accept a Bid at x4 ECU : means you agree to sell a security in exchange for x4 ECU.
Accept an Ask at y5 ECU : means you agree to pay y5 ECU for a security.
Two ways to Buy:
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• Submit a Bid: Input a price that you are willing to pay for one security as a bid (Box E ) and
click ‘Submit Bid’. The bidding price has to be higher than or equal to the highest current
bid. Your bids will only be successful (you successfully buy a security) when another participant
accepts your bid.
OR
• Accept an existing Ask: Select offer with the lowest price from the Ask List (Box A) and click
on the ‘Buy’ button at the bottom.
Two ways to Sell:
• Submit an Ask: Input a price at which you are willing to sell one security as an Ask (Box B)
and click ‘Submit Ask’. The asking price has to be lower than or equal to the lowest current
ask. Your security will be sold when another participant accepts your ask.
OR
• Accept an existing Bid: Select bid with the highest price from the Bid List (Box D) and click
on the ‘Sell’ button at the bottom.
Note:
• You can submit multiple bids/asks. Each bid/ask is for one unit of security. You cannot accept
your own bids/asks.
• The List of Bids (Asks) will be arranged according to the price in descending (ascending) order
and the order of submissions in ascending (ascending) order.
• If your bids/asks are accepted by other traders, there will be a corresponding deduction/increase
of cash from the cash account and increase/fall in the security holding in Box H. Note that you
are only allowed to submit a bid/ask if you have sufficient cash/number of securities to trade. If
you no longer have adequate cash on hand/security in the inventory to support your outstanding
bid/ask, your bid/ask will be invalidated.
• After submitting a bid/ask, you have the option to withdraw your bid/ask by selecting your
bid/ask (in blue color) and clicking on the “Withdraw Bid (Ask)” button in Box F (Box C).
• You will receive messages (Box G) about your successful actions.
• At the start of a period, the screen will display the Dividend Drawing Page (Appendix A-1 ). At
the end of a period, the screen will display a summary page (Appendix A-2 ).
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[The following information only in treatment FP ]
During the trading period, you may buy or sell securities or you may do nothing. The trading
is anonymous.
Basic concept of Bid and Ask:
The Bid price: the price that the experimenter is willing to pay for a security, in this case fixed
at 2.5 ECU.
The Ask price: the price that the experimenter is willing to receive for a security, fixed at 2.5
ECU.
Buy from Experimenter : means you indicate your willingness to buy a security from the experi-
menter.
Sell to the Experimenter : means you indicate your willingness to sell a security to the experi-
menter.
To Buy: The price per unit of security is fixed at 2.5 ECUs. You can buy a security by clicking
the “Buy from experimenter” button. Your bid will only be successful (you successfully buy a security)
when the experimenter accepts your bid.
To Sell: The price per unit of security is fixed at 2.5 ECUs. You can sell a security by clicking
the “Sell to experimenter” button. Your security will be sold when the experimenter accepts your ask.
Note:
• The experimenter will execute submitted offers to buy and sell according to the order of sub-
missions.
• You can submit multiple bids/asks. Each bid/ask is for one unit of security.
• The list of bids (asks) will be arranged according to the order of submissions in ascending
(ascending) order.
• After submitting a bid/ask, you have the option to withdraw your bid/offer by selecting your
bid/ask (in clue color) and clicking on the “Withdraw Bid (Ask)” button in Box F (Box C).
• You will receive messages (Box G) about your successful actions.
• If your bids/asks are accepted by the experimenter, there will be a corresponding deduction/increase
of cash from the cash account and increase/fall in the security holding in Box H. Note that you
are only allowed to submit a bid/ask if you have sufficient cash/number of securities to trade.
If you no longer have adequate cash on hand/security inventory to support your outstanding
bid/ask, your bid/ask will be invalidated.
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• At the start of a period, the screen will display the Dividend Drawing Page (Appendix A-1 ). At
the end of a period, the screen will display a summary page (Appendix A-2 ).
5. Trading Profit
Your earnings for a round are determined by the cash you are holding at the last
period of that round.
So, if you end a period without cash, and the round terminates at that period, you will earn zero
ECU for that round. This does not mean, however, that you should always end one period with only
cash and no securities. If you do so and that period is not the terminal period, you will not receive
dividends in the next period. Consequently, you start the next period without cash (since cash cannot
be carried over periods) unless you receive income in that next period.
We will run as many rounds as can be fit in the allotted time for the experiment. If the ongoing
round has not been terminated within 10 minutes before the end of the session, then we will throw
the dice. If 1-5 is drawn then we move to the next period and that period will be the last period. If
6 is drawn, then the current period is the terminal period.
Two randomly chosen rounds will be selected to determine your final payment from this exper-
iment. However, if we only have one round for the entire two (2) hours, then you will receive twice
the amount of earnings from that round. If there are exactly two (2) rounds, then you will receive the
sum of earnings from these two rounds.
DECISION PROBLEM STAGE
In this part of the experiment you will be asked to make a series of choices. How much you
receive will depend partly on chance and partly on the choices you make. The decision problems are
not designed to test you. What we want to know is what choices you would make in them. The only
right answer is what you really would choose.
For each line in the table in the next page, please state whether you prefer option A or option B.
Notice that there are 10 lines in the table but just one line will be randomly selected for payment.
You do not know which line will be paid when you make your choices. Hence you should pay attention
to the choice you make in every line.
Reward Scheme
After you have completed all your choices, the computer will randomly select a line in the table.
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Your earnings for the selected line depend on which option you chose: If you chose option A in
that line, you will receive 1 SGD. If you chose option B in that line, the computer will randomly
determine if your payoff is 0 or 3 SGD with the probabilities stated in option B in that line.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and we will attend to you in private.
Appendix A-1: Dividend Drawing Screen (shown before trading starts
in each period)
Treatments BL, CI, MM and FP
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Treatment CD
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Appendix A-2: Trading Summary Screen (shown after trading ends
in each period)
Treatments BL, CI and MM
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Treatment CD
44
Treatment FP
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Appendix A-3: Schematic Diagram of Trading Page
Treatments BL, CI, MM and CD
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Treatment FP
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